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Summary  findings
Recent legislation-  to provide income security to workers  insecurity in Indonesia. The connection between
in Indonesia covers only those in the formal sector,  underemployment  and income insecurity is problematic
initially. But workers in the informal sector are at even  in theory and remains unsubstantiated  by national survey
greater risk of income loss and are more vulnerable to  data.
shocks because of lower average incomes.  Third, many mechanisms already exist in Indonesia to
Wiebe addresses the question of whether there is a  mitigate the disruption caused by income insecurity.
rationale for income security schemes for Indonesia's  Households and communities use private strategies to
informal sector. His research suggests that, through a  smooth consumptioni and investment, and the
range of existing public programs, Indonesia's  government is already active in providing additional
government already provides important security  income security.
mechanisms for informal sector workers, and must  Not only does empirical evidence fail to justify a major
continue to do so. He finds no compelling evidence of  niew  policy response, says Wiebe, but most evidence
the need for a nationwide  inconme  security scheme for  suggests that such a response is not necessary at this time.
such workers.  Wiebe suggests that any new initiative directed at
He bases his argument against a new income security  income insecurity should probably be limited in scope
scheme on three main conclusions:  and should focus on Eastern Indonesia and on remote or
First, contrary to popular belief in Indonesia, only  isolated areas of Java, areas with low average incomes. If
about 12 percent of the workforce in the informal sector  concerns about income insecurity persist, money should
(nor 40 percent) - and even less in the formal sector - be spent finding out where it actually is before
is underemployed.  implementing a nationwide scheme to deal with it.
Seconid,  this level of underemployment does not
represent compelling e-mpirical  evidence of income
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With  the recent enactment  of JAMSOSTEK,  the Government  of Indonesia  created
an important  mechanism  to provide  income  security  to workers. Although  the law is
intended  to cover everyone  eventually,  in its initial  stages  of implementation  the law will
cover only those workers  in the formal  sector. Workers  in the informal  sector, however,
face not only much  greater risk  of income  loss, but also are more vulnerable  to these
shocks  due to their lower  average  incomes.' While  other countries  have  found  that public
works programs,  when well  designed,  can provide  a measure  of income  security  to
workers  in the informal  sector, Indonesia  does not have such  a scheme  at this time,  and it
may  be years  before  JAMSOSTEK  is able  to provide  an adequate  safety  net for these
workers. In this context,  this paper  considers  whether  a need  for such  a new income
security  program  for workers  in the informal  sector exists  in Indonesia  today.
The remainder  of this paper is divided  into three sections. The first section
examines  the state of the Indonesian  labor  market  in the informal  sector. Because income
insecurity  may  be strongly  connected  with high  levels  of underemployment,  this section
explores  the nature of underemployment  in the informal  sector in Indonesia,
disaggregating  the data by season,  age, gender  and region. Data from  the 1993  National
Labor Survey  (SAKERNAS)  reflect  high  underemployment  in all categories,  but the
highest  incidence  of underemployment  can be found  among  women,  in rural areas, and in
eastem Indonesia. In absolute  numbers,  however,  there are more  underemployed  men
than women  (because  men  comprise  a disproportionate  share  of the workforce),  and more
are found on Java than elsewhere. Somewhat  surprisingly,  the data show no real  pattern
of seasonality  in the level of underemployment,  even  in rural areas.
The second  section  of the paper discusses  existing  mechanisms  that generate
security  for workers in the informal  sector. While  JAMSOSTEK  may  not cover these
workers  yet, the Government  of Indonesia  has an impressive  array of other programs  that,
at least indirectly,  may  provide  a safety  net to some  members  of the informal  sector.
While  Inpres  Desa Tertinggal  has received  considerable  renown  for generating  new
income-earning  activities  in backward  areas,  there are many  other programs  with less
visibility  that represent  real safety  nets, including  efforts  by the Department  of Social
Welfare  (DEPSOS)  and the Department  of Manpower  (DEPNAKER).  Moreover,
households  are not ignorant  of the vagaries  of the informal  sector;  living  in this
environment,  many  workers  develop  their own private  schemes  for generating  some  level
of security. One of the most common  of these schemes  is the diversification  of income
sources  to reduce  household  vulnerability  to drops in income  from any single  source.
The final section  of the paper  will return  to the original  question:  is there a
rationale  for income  security  schemes  for the informal  sector in Indonesia? This  research
suggests  that, through a range  of existing  public  programs,  the Government  of Indonesia
already  plays  an important  role in providing  security  mechanisms  to workers in the
' For the purpose  of this study,  the informal  sector  includes  all workers  except  those paid regular  wages  in
the non-agricultural  sectors.
1informal  sector, and continued  involvement  will  remain  necessary  in the immediate  future.
To the extent  that isolated  segments  of the labor  market  continue  to face problems  of
income  insecurity,  there may  be opportunities  for the government  to expand  upon its
current  efforts. However,  there is no compelling  evidence  indicating  the need for a
nationwide  income  security  scheme  for workers in the informal  sector.
The argument  against  a new income  security  scheme  is based on three conclusions
of this study. First, contrary  to the belief,  widely  held  in Indonesia,  that underemployment
exceeds  40 percent  of the workforce,  data from a 1993 survey  of Indonesian  workers
indicate  that only about 12  percent of those  in the informal  sector (and even  less in the
formal  sector)  can be characterized  as working  too few  hours. 2 Second,  although  this
research  yields  evidence  of underemployment,  no empirical  evidence  of income  insecurity
in Indonesia  exists  to date; indeed,  the connection  between  underemployment  and income
insecurity  is dubious  on theoretical  grounds  and remains  unsubstantiated  by national
survey  data. Third,  many  mechanisms  already  exist  in Indonesia  to mitigate  the disruption
caused  by income  insecurity.  Households  and communities  employ  private strategies  to
smooth consumption  and investment  patterns,  and the Government  of Indonesia  already  is
very active in providing  additional  income  security. Taken  together,  these three
conclusions  indicate  that not only  does empirical  evidence  fail  to justify  a major new policy
response,  but most of the evidence  available  suggests  that such  a response  is not necessary
at this time.
I.  The State of the Labor  Market in the Informal  Sector
The informal  sector  in Indonesia  accounts  for a large share  of the total working
population. As  recently  as 1993,  the formal  sector accounted  for just under one-third  of
the workforce,  leaving  approximately  68 percent in the informal  sector. 3 Of course, not
everyone  in the informal  sector  experiences  income  insecurity;  an adequate  household
income  levels  (which  permits  savings),  the possession  of assets (which  represents  a form
of insurance),  and steady  productive  employment  (which  implies  a stable source  of
income)  all provide  protection  from unexpected  fluctuations  in household  income  levels.
Vulnerability  in the informal  sector is produced  by a combination  of low income
levels  and unstable  income  sources. When  the poor and  the near poor are forced to rely
on infrequent  and unpredictable  employment,  they  are susceptible  to unforeseen  external
shocks. 4 Uncertain  incomes  adversely  affect  household  welfare  levels,  as they can distort
2 Current  trends in the labor  market  suggest  that underemployment  will decline  over  time. Labor flows
from agricultural  to non-agricultural  activities  and from the informal  sector to the formal sector  both
imply  higher employment  rates and declining  levels  of underemployment.
3 Author's calculations  using data from the 1993  SAKIERNAS  survey. Respondents  who described  their
primary  form of work  as either permanent  workers (buruh  tetap)  or workers  (buruhlkaryawan)  were
considered  members  of the formal sector,  and these  accounted  for 31.8 percent  of all workers in 1993.
4In  addition  to the roughly 15  percent of the population  living  below  the official  poverty  line, there are
many additional  households  living near the poverty  line  whose  status as "non-poor"  is probably  better
understood  as "near poor," as a significant  economic  shock  would  likely push  them below  the poverty  line.
2both consumption  and investment  decisions. In this context,  underemployment  can be
seen  as an indicator  of (or proxy for) income  insecurity  in the informal  sector. Although
some  Indonesian  workers certainly  have adequate  incomes  and others may  possess  some
family  assets,  neither  of these  forms of security  are likely  to be prevalent  among  workers
in the informal  sector. Moreover,  there is likely  to be a strong  positive  correlation
between  the three forms  of protection  listed above;  households  without  steady sources  of
employment  are less  likely  to have  either  assets or adequate  income  levels. As a result,
workers  with infrequent  and/or irregular  work opportunities  (i.e., the underemployed)
probably  live  in households  that are most vulnerable  to external  shocks  that affect  their
earnings.
It is important  to note, however,  that the connection  drawn  here  between
underemployment  and income  insecurity  is problematic,  at best. The most serious  concern
is the fact that, while  underemployment  is a phenomenon  that affects  individuals,  income
vulnerability  occurs at the household  level;  because  fluctuations  are likely  to decline  at
higher  levels  of aggregation,  looking  at statistics  on underemployment  almost  certainly
overstates  the incidence  of income  insecurity.  For example,  a household  with many
insecure  sources  of income  may  be far less  vulnerable  than another  household  with the
same  (or even higher)  income  that comes from  only one source. Access  to other forms of
insurance  may  vary across  households,  further  complicating  the connection  between
underemployment  and income  insecurity.  Thus, even as one considers  the description  of
the informal  labor  market  which  follows,  it is important  to keep in mind  the fact that
underemployment  is an imperfect  (and biased)  proxy  for income  insecurity.
A Woriang Definition of "Underemployment"for  Indonesia
Underemployment  is widespread  in Indonesia. The 1993  National  Labor Force
Survey  (SAKERNAS)  provides  ample  evidence  of the magnitude  of the problem. Using
the traditional  standard  (less  than 35 hours per week), nearly  two-fifths  of the total
Indonesian  labor  force (39.7 percent)  are underemployed.  Even  a stricter standard  defined
as "severe  underemployment"  (less  than  25 hours  per week) identifies  almost  one-quarter
(23.1 percent)  as working  too few hours. 5 In the informal  sector, the incidence  of
underemployment  is far higher. Almost  half  of the workers  in the informal  sector (48.6
percent)  work less  than 35 hours, and 29.8 percent  could  be categorized  as severely
underemployed.
The traditional  standard  of underemployment  (less  than  35 hours per week)  is of
limited  value to this study  for three reasons. First,  this standard  captures  too large a
portion  of the labor  market;  any definition  that identifies  nearly  one out of every  two
Indonesian  workers  in the informal  sector as needing  additional  security  assistance  is too
Although  establishing  any definitional  cutoff  for the near poor would  be arbitrary,  an example  from 1993
demonstrates  the magnitude  of the group  living  just above  the poverty  line; while about 25 million
Indonesians  (or 13.5 percent  of the population)  had monthly  expenditures  below  Rp. 20,000,  another 52.7
million  (or 28 percent of the total  population)  lived  on between  Rp. 20,000  and Rp. 30,000  per month.
5 Kenneth  Chomitz, 1991.
3broad to be useful  for policy  guidance. Second,  such figures  of underemployment  are not
consistent  with the reality  of intensive  activity  observed  in informal  labor  markets
throughout  Indonesia. Third,  using only  the hours  worked as an indicator  of the need  for
more  work ignores  the choices  made by some  individuals  not to work more  hours at the
prevailing  wage rate. Underemployment  is likely  to be a problem  for workers  only if they
would  like  to work more hours and  cannot.
Fortunately,  the SAKERNAS  data also include  information  concerning  whether  the
workers  would  like  to work more  hours. While  there clearly  are problems  with using  this
information  (for example,  willingness  to work more  hours must be related  to some
concept  of the wage  level,  but the survey  is silent  on this  issue),  it still  seems  more
reasonable  to use this information  than to ignore  it. Moreover,  the proportion  of the
population  that both works less  than 35 hours each week  and wants to work more (12.5
percent)  is both more  meaningful  and more  useful  for policy  purposes. For the rest of the
paper, these two conditions  will  be used to define  the underemployed  in Indonesia's
informal  sector. 6
The Structural Nature of Underemployment in Indonesia
Using  this definition,  several  striking  patterns  emerge  in the data (see Table 1).
First, women  experience  a higher  rate of underemployment  (13.0 percent)  than do men
(11.7 percent). Second,  rural  workers  in the informal  sector experience  a higher  rate of
underemployment  (13.1 percent)  than do their urban  counterparts  (8.3 percent).
Interestingly,  the urban-rural  distinction  is stronger  than  the gender  distinction,  as rural
men  are more  likely  to be underemployed  than are urban  women. This feature, combined
with the fact that more than  four-fifths  of the labor  force (81.9 percent)  is located  in rural
areas, demonstrates  that underemployment  in the informal  sector remains  overwhelmingly
a rural phenomenon.  Seven  out of eight, or nearly  88 percent of the underemployed,  are
found in rural areas.
6 Several  readers  of earlier drafts  of this paper have  questioned  the appropriateness  of using 35-hour
standard  for  all types  of  work  in the  informal  sector;  the  traditional  norm  for  a "standard"  work  weeks  for
an agricultural  laborer,  for example,  mnay  be very  different  from that expected  from a street  vendor.
Although  the cut-off  of 35 hours admittedly  is arbitrary  (albeit  conventional),  the second  part of the
definition  of underemployment  (wanting  more  work)  introduces  considerable  flexibility  across  types  of
work. For example,  if an agricultural  laborer  is satisfied  with  a shorter  (but  "standard")  work  week,  he or
she would  be counted  among  the fully employed.  Were such  a worker  to desire more  work,  despite
completing  a "standard"  work  week, it seems  reasonable  to consider  the person  underemployed.  Given
the low  hourly  returns  to employment  in the informal  sector,  one might  argue that the weekly  cut-off  be
raised  from 35 hours to 40 hours or more, but once  one departs  from convention,  the selection  of any other
line would  appear even more  arbitrary  unless  it is connected  to another standard,  such as the poverty  line
or the minimum  wage.
4Table 1. Percent  Underemployed  by Gender  and Location
Male  Female  Total  Pop. Share
Urban  7.9  8.9  8.3  18.1
Rural  12.6  13.8  13.1  81.9
Total  11.7  13.0  12.2  100
Pop. Share  58.3  41.7  100  I
Note: Unless  otherwise  indicated,  figures  in tables  are  based  on the  population  of
workers  in the informal  sector,  excluding  both  those  with  formal  sector  jobs  and
those  not  wanting  more  work. The  source  for  all  data  described  in this  paper  is the
1993  SAKERNAS  survey.
A breakdown of the underemployed by gender and age describes a similar patterm
for men and women, with  the highest rates of underemployment occur among young
workers (see Table 2).  For both men and women, workers under 35 years of age
experience higher than average rates of underemployment. The rate of underemployment
for women is above that for men except among the very youngest and the two oldest age
categories.
Table 2.  Percent Underemployed by Gender and Age
Age  Range  Male  Female  Total
10-14  17.8  16.5  18.3
15-19  26.4  27.0  26.7
20-24  20.7  22.1  21.3
25-29  13.7  16.5  14.9
30-34  11.5  13.4  12.4
35-39  9.8  12.2  10.8
40-44  8.5  8.7  8.6
45-49  7.2  8.6  7.8
50-54  6.0  6.2  6.1
55-59  5.9  5.2  5.6
60 +  3.6  3.6  3.6
Total  11.7  13.0  12.2
The concentration of younger workers among the underemployed is displayed
graphically in Figure 1 below.  Workers under the age of  30 account for more than half of
sthe underemployed,  despite  the fact that they account  for less  than one-third  of all workers
in the informal  sector. Workers  under  the age of 40 account  for nearly  four out of five the
underemployed,  despite  the fact that they  represent  fewer  than  three out of five in the
working  population. These data strongly  reject the notion that the underemployed  are
made  up of individuals  are too old to work; the vast majority  of the underemployed  appear
to be physically  suited for additional  employment.
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Table  3 below  disaggregates  the labor  force  by level  of education. Again,  there is
a discernible  pattern that is consistent  for both men  and women. While  workers  who have
never completed  primary  school  have  lower  than average  rates of underemployment,  SD,
SNP and SMA graduates  appear  to have  difficulty  finding  sufficient  employment  that is
suitable  given  their level  of education. However,  only  about 15 percent of the labor force
in the informal  sector has education  beyond  the primary  school  (SD) level;  as a result,
even  though underemployment  rates are higher  among  most categories  of junior high
(SNP), senior  high school  (SMA)  and academy  graduates,  these groups  represent  very
small  portions  of the underemployed  work  force. In fact, more  than four out of five (80.9
percent)  underemployed  workers  are characterized  by low levels  of educational  attainment
(no higher  than SD graduate).
6Table 3. Percent Underemployed by Gender and Education
Education  Male  Female  Total  Share of Population
None  8.4  10.1  9.4  15.1
Some SD  10.3  11.6  10.9  28.7
SD Graduate  12.6  14.2  13.2  40.5
SMP General  14.2  16.6  14.9  8.5
SMP Vocational  11.5  13.9  12.3  1.3
SMA General  15.6  19.9  16.8  3.6
SMA Vocational  11.5  24.2  15.2  2.0
Diploma I/II  10.5  19.8  14.1  0.1
Academy  13.2  17.9  14.6  0.2
University  11.2  14.0  11.9  0.2
Total  11.7  13.0  12.2  100
Given the fact that rural workers experience higher rates of underemployment, it is
not too surprising to find that agriculture-related sectors of the economy are characterized
by above average rates of underemployment. Table 4 below presents the incidence of
underemployment by primary sector of employment. The first four categories are what
would typically be considered to be agricultural activities and account for nearly two-
thirds (64.5 percent) of the work force in the informal sector; all four categories have
higher than average rates of underemployment. The only other category that represents an
important share of the population is trade and retail, and this category is characterized by
very low rates of underemployment. While there are differences across gender, it is
interesting to note how similar the pattern is for both men and women.
A breakdown of underemployment by primary sector and location (not shown)
demonstrates that these workers in the first four categories account for most (81.9
percent) of the underemployment in rural areas, as would be expected.  A somewhat more
surprising result, however, is that 16.9 percent of urban workers claim agricultural
activities as their primary form of employment, and these workers account for 30.8
percent of urban underemployment. In other words, almost one-third of urban
underemployment in the informal sector can be accounted for by workers who are
employed in sectors that are normally considered rural activities.
7Table 4.  Percent Underemployed by Gender and Primary Sector of Employment
Male  Female  Total
Sector  Male  Population  Female  Population  Total  Population
Farming  12.8  46.3  14.1  45.1  13.3  45.8
Plantations  12.3  10.9  12.0  8.5  12.3  9.9
Livestock &
Fisheries  20.0  9.3  26.7  6.2  22.1  8.0
Forestry & Hunting  21.1  1.1  25.3  0.8  22.5  1.0
Mining & Oil  13.4  0.8  17.9  0.4  14.6  0.6
Food & Tobacco  9.7  1.1  13.9  3.1  12.5  1.9
Textiles & Leather  8.5  0.4  12.7  1.7  11.7  0.9
Wood Products  10.5  1.3  15.2  1.9  12.8  1.6
Other Industries  8.9  1.6  14.5  3.0  12.2  2.2
Electric, Gas &
Water  13.0  0.1  43.2  0.0  15.7  0.0
Construction  10.3  1.7  20.7  0.1  10.7  1.1
Trade & Retail  5.7  15.9  6.2  25.8  6.0  20.0
Transportation  5.4  5.3  9.3  0.2  5.4  3.1
Finance, Insurance  7.9  0.1  0.9  0.1  5.7  0.1
Civil Service  14.6  0.1  0.0  0.0  11.8  0.0
Private Social
Work  9.8  1.7  19.3  1.3  13.2  1.5
Others  12.6  2.4  19.9  1.8  15.2  2.1
Unclear Activities  23.4  0.1  23.5  0.3  23.5  0.2
Total  11.7  100  13.0  100  12.2  100
The Seasonality of Underemployment in Indonesia
Underemployment is generally  believed to fluctuate with the agricultural seasons
for two reasons. First, because most of the underemployed are located in rural areas and
are engaged in agriculture-related tasks, the swings in local labor demand may have an
immediate and direct effect on underemployment. Second, seasonal agricultural
employment may not only affect overall employment levels directly, but also indirectly, as
fluctuating rural incomes would affect the demand for other rural products and services.
Table 5 presents a breakdown of underemployment by quarter and by gender.
Surprisingly, there is no discernible pattern of seasonality in the national underemployment
statistics.
8Table 5. Percent  Underemployed  by Quarter  and Gender
|  Ist  2nd  3rd  4th  Total
Male  12.4  11.6  11.7  11.3  11.7
Female  12.5  12.9  13.3  13.2  13.0
Total  12.4  12.1  12.4  12.1  12.2
There are two possible  reasons  why  the data would  not show  seasonality  if, in fact,
such  variation  exists.7  First, while  the data are broken  up by quarter,  the seasons  may  not
actually  follow  this pattern,  and peaks or troughs  in labor  demand  may straddle  quarters,
confounding  this distinction. Second,  seasons  may  vary across  regions  in Indonesia,  and
so a peak  demand  in Sumatra,  for example,  might  be counterbalanced  by weak labor
demand  elsewhere.
Although  the first problem  cannot  be corrected  given  the SAKERNAS  data, it is
possible  to disaggregate  to the regional  and provincial  level  to see if seasonality  emerges
at these levels. Table  6 shows  both the province  and regional  rates of underemployment.
Although  the data obviously  show  variation  across  provinces  and regions,  this variation
shows  no obvious  seasonal  pattern.  In fact, the variation  observed  in levels  of
underemployment  in adjacent  provinces  on any given  island,  where  relevant  conditions
should  be similar,  seems  more likely  to be a statistical  artifact  than the result  of any
seasonal  phenomenon.
The data in Table  6 identify  several  provinces  with higher  than average  rates of
underemployment.  Underemployment  in West  Nusa Tenggara  (NTB) averages  almost  33
percent,  fifty  percent  higher  than  the second  highest  rate recorded  by Bali with 21.1
percent. While  NTB's rate is not unexpected,  the figure  for Bali is certainly  surprising  and
difficult  to interpret;  at the very least, the high  underemployment  rate reported for Bali
reinforces  some  of the doubts  expressed  earlier  in this paper about  the assumed  connection
between  underemployment  and income  insecurity.  With its productive  agricultural  sector,
thriving  traditional  industrial  sector  and booming  tourist sector, Bali  residents  might  be
expected  to have  among  the most diversified  and stable  income  streams. The evidence
from the SAKERNAS  data raises  fewer  doubts  about popular  preconceptions  of the
Balinese  economy  than about the reliability  of the data and  the underlying  connection
between  underemployment  and income  insecurity.
7 Of  course,  another  possibility  is that  labor  demand  does  not  experience  significant  changes  across  the
seasons. This alternative  explanation  certainly  would  be consistent  with  the data in Table 5 and with
agricultural  wage data published  by BPS, which  show no seasonal  fluctuations;  Kenneth  Chomitz,  among
others,  has suggested  that widespread  irrigation  on Java  may  explain  the absence  of seasonality  in labor
demand  there. Even  so, the widespread  perception  of seasonality  in labor  demand  is based on evidence
provided  by rural workers  who describe  seasonality  in their work  patterns.
9Table 6. Percent  Underemployed  in the Informal  Sector  by Quarter  and Province
Province  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Total
Aceh  9.3  13.1  10.9  11.9  11.3
N. Sumatra  12.1  10.6  10.6  11.0  11.1
W. Sumatra  16.8  15.9  14.5  14.9  15.6
Riau  9.2  6.7  13.3  10.5  10.0
Jambi  7.8  4.2  10.3  8.3  7.6
S. Sumatra  9.7  9.3  7.5  9.4  9.0
Bengkulu  3.3  4.5  4.7  4.9  4.4
Lampung  10.0  8.6  6.7  5.4  7.8
Sumatra  10.7  9.7  9.7  9.7  10.0
Jakarta  1.1  1.3  3.3  2.4  2.0
W. Java  11.7  12.8  11.6  11.2  11.8
C. Java  10.6  10.2  9.5  8.7  9.8
Yogyakarta  9.1  13.8  16.2  15.0  13.4
E. Java  14.7  14.7  17.1  17.2  15.9
Java  12.0  12.3  12.8  12.4  12.4
Bali  26.4  19.2  17.2  21.4  21.1
NTB  33.6  32.0  33.4  31.9  32.7
NTT  7.4  9.0  10.1  7.6  8.5
E. Timor  14.2  11.0  21.0  8.7  13.8
W. Kalimantan  5.4  6.2  5.3  5.2  5.5
C. Kalimantan  13.1  12.3  7.3  9.9  10.7
S. Kalimantan  14.0  13.8  15.9  16.6  15.1
E. Kalimantan  12.0  15.3  12.9  12.1  13.0
N. Sulawesi  16.2  12.7  9.7  8.3  11.9
C. Sulawesi  13.5  14.6  18.5  19.5  16.5
S. Sulawesi  11.4  10.0  12.4  12.7  11.6
SE. Sulawesi  16.1  14.6  14.4  15.2  15.1
Maluku  15.4  9.3  10.0  10.3  11.2
Irian  Jaya  12.0  11.6  7.6  6.3  9.6
East Indonesia  14.9  13.9  13.7  13.7  14.1
Total  12.4  12.1  12.3  12.1  12.2
Several  other provinces  in Eastern  Indonesia  have  rates at or around 15 percent,  a
level  reached  only  by West Sumatra  and East Java in the western  part of Indonesia. Table
106 clearly  demonstrates  that the highest  rates  of underemployment  are found off Java (and
largely  off Sumatra),  but because  of the population  density  there, approximately  two-
thirds  of the underemployed  are found on Java.
Because  the SAKERNAS  data were not collected  with the intention  of estimating
statistics  at the kabupaten  level,  any disaggregation  at this level  must be treated  with
considerable  caution. Such estimates  of kabupaten  underemployment  rates (not shown
here) describe  a pattern  similar  to that seen at the province  level;  while  it is possible  to
identify  the kabupatens  with higher  than average  rates, these statistics  demonstrate  no
discernible  pattern of seasonality.
There is another  possible  explanation  for the lack  of seasonality  in
underemployment  in the informal  sector as measured  using SAKERNAS  data. Recalling
that demand  for agricultural  labor  has both a direct  and an indirect  effect  on the local  labor
market,  if the direct  effect  of seasonal  labor demand  on underemployment  is immediate
while  the indirect  effect  (via consumer  demand)  on rural  non-agricultural  demand  for labor
operates  with a lag, real seasonal  fluctuations  in underemployment  for agricultural  labor
might remain  hidden  from the simple  statistical  searches  given  in Tables  5 and 6. The
figures  provided  below in Table  7 track quarterly  variation  in underemployment  only
among  farm  workers. 8
Table 7. Percent of Farm  Workers  Underemployed  by Quarter  and Gender
I_____T_ 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Total
Male  13.1  13.6  12.8  11.7  12.8
Female  13.6  14.7  14.3  13.9  14.1
Total  13.3  14.0  13.4  12.6  13.3
Compared  to the underemployment  figures  of all workers  in the informal  sector
shown  in Table  5, the numbers  in Table  7 indicate  that agricultural  workers  do face greater
fluctuations  from quarter  to quarter  than are shown  in the aggregate  statistics. Full
employment  rates for male  farm  workers  decline  by 14  percent from  the peak quarter of
labor demand  to the quarter  of weakest  demand,  while  rates for female  farm  workers drop
by 7.5 percent;  for all workers  in the informal  sector, such  quarterly  fluctuations  are only
8.9 and 6 percent,  respectively.
a This  group  represents  45.8  percent  of  the  total  workforce  in the  informal  sector.  Other  agricultural
occupations,  such  as livestock,  fisheries  and  plantations,  were  not included,  because  these  activities  either
have  no  obvious  seasonality  or have  seasonal  patterns  that  differ  from  those  seen  in crop-based  farming
activities.
11The seasonality  of underemployment  among  farm  workers  is only  part of the story.
Non-farm  workers  represent  more  than half  of the workforce  in the informal  sector, and
the pattern of labor  demand  they  face differs  from  that of farm  workers. The data in Table
8 show  that during  the second  quarter,  when underemployment  among  farm  workers is
highest,  non-farm  workers are experiencing  their lowest  rates of underemployment. 9 This
phenomenon  explains  why  the aggregate  SAKERNAS  data display  no seasonality;  while
both farm  and non-farm  sectors  experience  seasonality,  these  peaks and troughs occur
during  different  quarters. As a result, although  aggregate  demand  in the informal  sector
appears  relatively  stable  across quarters,  vulnerability  at the household  level is probably
higher  than these aggregate  statistics  suggests.
Table 8.  Percent of Non-Farm Workers Underemployed by Quarter and Gender
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Total
Male  11.7  10.1  10.8  10.8  10.9
Female  11.4  11.5  12.5  12.7  12.0
Total  11.6  10.7  11.5  11.6  11.4
The figures  provided  in Tables  7 and 8 have  two important  implications.  First,
aggregated  underemployment  statistics  almost  certainly  understate  the magnitude  of the
problem  of underemployment  as experienced  at the household  level. While  approximately
12  percent of the informal  sector  may  be underemployed  at any  given  time, a far higher
percentage  is probably  underemployed  at some  time during  the year. If the average
duration  of underemployment  for any  single  worker  were three months  (and experienced
only once a year), for example,  the 12 percent  underemployment  rate would  imply  that
nearly  half of the workers  in the informal  sector experience  underemployment  at some
time during  the year. Even such short periods  of underemployment  (indeed,  perhaps  even
the possibility  of underemployment)  may  be a sufficient  source  of uncertainty  to lower
household  welfare  levels  significantly,  especially  if these periods  are unpredictable
occurrences.
Second,  although  different  sub-groups  of the population  experience  patterns  of
seasonality,  with higher  vulnerability  during  certain  times of the year,  in aggregate,  the
informal  sector (both in urban  and rural areas)  has a fairly  stable  degree  of need. In
thinking  about the parameters  of a policy  response  to income  insecurity,  the stability  of
need is probably  more important  than  the shifting  description  of those  who are vulnerable
at any  given  time.
9 sNon-farm  workers in the informal  sector  experience  lower  levels  of underemployment  than their farm-
based  counterparts,  but they experience  the same (for  men) or higher (for  women)  seasonal  fluctuation  in
employment  demand.
12Policy makers often are concerned with responding to seasonal fluctuations in the
labor market, as the perception is that large segments of the labor market may be affected
at a regular time every year. Policy responses to such phenomena not only often have a
broad popular appeal, but also are relatively easy to manage, with obvious start-up and
completion dates.  Interestingly, regular fluctuations in the labor market may be the
phenomena that least require policy interventions, as households can prepare private
responses for the downturns in advance (for example, shifting from agricultural labor to
other types of employment during the off-season, or simply saving eamings for the
anticipated periods of underemployment).  Although seasonality of underemployment is an
interesting phenomenon, unanticipated economic shocks probably generate far higher
levels of welfare loss.
A General Description of Underemployment in Indonesia
The SAKERNAS data provide a useful description of underemployed workers in
the informal sector.  More than 12 percent of the population work less than 35 hours and
would like additional employment. Although many are women, a larger number are men.
The vast majority of the underemployed workers are found in rural areas, and even many
of the urban unemployed are active in agricultural economic activities. Both farm and
non-farm workers experience seasonality in their employment opportunities, but these
patterns tend to balance each other out, providing a misleadingly  stable appearance to the
aggregate labor market in the informal sector. While education appears to make
underemployment more likely, most of the underemployed have little or no education (at
most, they have passed primary school).  And while rates of underemployment are higher
in Eastern Indonesia, most of the underemployed can be found on Java.
The Seasonality of Earnings
The use of underemployment as a proxy for income insecurity is necessitated by
the paucity of reliable information concerning the fluctuations in household incomes in
Indonesia. The SUSENAS expenditure survey provides important insights into
expenditure levels in Indonesia, how those levels vary across regions within Indonesia, and
how they change over time.  Unfortunately, none of this information helps answer the
question of how variable household income levels are over time.  Consequently, while
SUSENAS data can be used to identify the households with low income levels who are
more vulnerable to income fluctuations, the data cannot identify those households (or their
location) which have actually suffered from income fluctuations.
While the SAKERNAS Labor Survey is not designed to generate the same wealth
of information about expenditures and incomes as that provided by SUSENAS, the labor
survey does collect information on both weekly and monthly earnings. While these data
do not track specific households throughout the year, they can be used to look at how
average levels of individual earnings fluctuate across quarters.  Significant  variation in the
mean values of all workers' earnings would suggest that at least some workers are
experiencing fluctuations in their personal income levels. Unfortunately, many workers in
13the informal  sector do not report weekly  or monthly  earnings;  only  workers in the
agricultural  sector  both qualify  as informal  sector workers  and produce  earnings  data in
the SAKERNAS  survey. Table  9 below  describes  the quarterly  fluctuations  of agricultural
workers' earnings.
Table 9.  Seasonal Fluctuations in Earnings Among Farm Workers
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Total
Farm Laborers
Weekly Earnings  12,054  11,878  12,508  12,191  12,127
Monthly  Eamings  51,660  50,904  53,605  52,246  51,975
All Farm Workers
Weekly Earnings  14,311  14,371  15,965  15,248  14,908
Monthly Earnings  61,332  61,589  68,423  65,350  63,893
Note: All farm  workers  include  farm  laborers  and  workers  on plantations,  in livestock  and fishing,  and
in forestry  and hunting.  Farm  laborers  account  for about  2.9  million  workers,  while  all farm  workers
account  for approximately  4.9  million  workers.
Somewhat  surprisingly,  earnings  for farm  laborers  display  very little  fluctuation
across  quarters. Both weekly  and monthly  wages  drop only  5 percent  from the peak
quarter (3) to the lowest  quarter  (2), declines  which  are smaller  than  those shown  in full
employment  levels;  recall  that the figures  in Table  7 demonstrated  that underemployment
among  farm  workers  declined  10 percent from  the peak quarter  to the lowest quarter.' 0
Including  in the analysis  other workers  in the agricultural  sector produces  a rather
different  picture,  as both weekly  and monthly  earnings  fluctuate  by over 10 percent from
the peak quarter  (3) to the lowest  quarter  (1). The fluctuations  are even  more striking  if
only non-farm  workers  in the agricultural  sector are considered;  mean  earnings  for
workers on plantations  and  in livestock,  fishery  and  forestry  activities  fluctuate  by more
than 15 percent from peak  to low quarters,  and variation  in individual  earnings  across
quarters  may  be considerably  higher. Moreover,  unless  variations  in earnings  across
quarters  are perfectly  correlated,  aggregation  of data and examination  of mean earning
levels  will  understate  the amount  of variation  experienced  by agricultural  workers.
Looking  the data  by region  demonstrates  how lower  levels  of aggregation  reveal
higher  levels  of fluctuation  in earnings. Sumatra  and Java are characterized  by the least
seasonality  while  Kalimantan,  Sulawesi  and  the rest of Eastern Indonesia  experience
'  These  findings  are  consistent  with  data  provided  by  BPS  concerning  average  wage  rates  for farm
workers. The BPS Publication,  "Statistik  Upah  Buruh  Tani di Pedesaan  1988-1994"  reports  a steady
linear increase  in nominal  wages  (reported  monthly)  throughout  the archipelago  with no evidence  of
seasonality  in wages  for planting,  hoeing,  and weeding.
14significantly  higher levels of fluctuation in monthly eamings.  The figures in Table 10
demonstrate another interesting pattern: variability in income does not appear to be
correlated with the level of earnings. Java and Eastern Indonesia have similarly  low
income levels but have very different drops from peak to low quarters, with Java earnings
reflecting far more stability  than do earnings in Eastern Indonesia; Sumatra and Sulawesi
have similarly  high levels of earnings but experience very different fluctuations in earnings
across seasons.
Table 10.  Seasonal Fluctuations in Earnings Among Farm Workers By Region
All Farm Workers  Ist  2nd  3rd  4th  Total
Sumatra  94,916  93,191  97,686  101,291  96,590
Java  52,525  52,256  60,014  57,140  55,156
Kalimantan  105,988  129,873  97,290  136,866  116,624
Sulawesi  69,378  82,930  134,374  71,525  90,596
Eastern Indonesia  43,956  49,008  56,433  42,840  46,576
Bali  96,850  76,504  87,078  78,231  83,266
Note: Jakarta  data  have  been  omitted,  as there  are  very  few  observations,  and  these  observations  are  very
different  from the rest of Java. The figures  for Bali are distinguished  from  both Java and Eastern
Indonesia  (its two most common  regional  placements),  as Bali's labor  market  appears  very  different  from
both. Eastern Indonesia  includes  West  and East  Nusa Tenggara  and East Timor. Both Maluku  and Irian
Jaya  were omitted  because  of the small number  of observations.
Recalling that income insecurity comes from a combination of low income levels
and fluctuations in income levels, the data in Table 10 suggest that Eastern Indonesia may
be characterized by the greatest extent of insecurity. The three provinces have the lowest
income level of any region, but are still characterized by considerable fluctuation in
earnings across quarters.  Earning levels on Java also appear to be very low, but exhibit
less fluctuation in earnings. Nonetheless, where these low earnings are combined with
variability, a combination that almost certainly occurs in some parts of Java, income
insecurity may be a real problem. 1 "  Unfortunately, the earnings data provided by
SAKERNAS do not allow this analysis  to be disaggregated to a level that would help
identify such regions.
"  See  A. Mason  (1996)  for a description  of rural poverty  on Java. Although  Mason  finds that poverty  is
not really localized  in pockets  if poverty,  his framework  for studying  the distribution  of poverty  across
zones defined  by their physical  and economic  characteristics  may be useful  in the context  of identifying
regions  that have many who suffer  from income  insecurity  (i.e.,  places  that are both  poor and cut off from
neighboring  markets).
15I1. Existing Income Security Mechanisms in Indonesia
The SAKERNAS data illustrate clearly the dimensions of the problem of
underemployment, and suggest that workers in the informal sector face not only low, but
also uncertain, incomes. Many households in Indonesia, however, do not have to face the
problem of income insecurity without any protection.  Private household strategies to
spread income uncertainty over time are the first line of defense. Even when these fail, the
Government of Indonesia provides a second line of protection through an array of income
and welfare programs.  While these programs may not protect everyone from suffering the
effects of income fluctuations, the problem of underemployment as described above
cannot be understood without looking at the context of existing private and public income
security mechanisms.
Private Income Security Mechanisms
The danger to household welfare of income loss is not a new concern in Indonesia.
Thirty years ago, before the introduction of modem irrigation and high-yielding  varieties,
incomes were much lower on average and, as a result, households were far more
vulnerable to seasonal fluctuations. The Indonesian government, moreover, had far fewer
resources than it does today to provide income insurance. In this context, households and
communities were forced to develop their own forms of income security. Two strategies
that are still seen in Indonesia today involve households diversifying  income sources and
communities provide a minimal  levels of income security.
The household strategy of diversifying  income sources may have been used in the
past, but the booming urban and modern sector provides rural households with countless
new opportunities.  In fact, it may be wrong to look at many workers in the informal
sector in isolation, as their income stream may be closely connected with extended families
that remain in the rural sector; uncertain incomes in urban areas (even if they are more
uncertain than incomes in rural areas) may increase the level of income security at the
household level.
There is some evidence that this security mechanism  is important in Indonesia.
One study of urban poverty in Jakarta found that almost all poor households, including
those living in extremely destitute conditions, remit significant  portions of their urban
incomes to family members remaining  in rural areas.  12 These transfers, moreover, flow
not only from urban to rural areas. Nearly three-fourths of rural households in Java, for
example, made private transfers to other households.  3 The important implication of these
transfers is that, even if income security for a given individual  were to fall as that worker
leaves agriculture for employment in the urban sector, overall income security for the
household may improve through the diversification  of income sources.'4 In fact, the rural
12 M. J. Breinholt, 1992.
13 World Development  Report,  The World  Bank, 1995,  p. 87.
14 In a recent  paper on the connection  between  labor markets  and poverty,  A. Mason  and J. Baptist
provide  strong  evidence  of income  diversification,  even  as they describe  a much less  important  role for
16and agricultural nature of underemployment suggests that the problem of income security
improves as workers leave largely agricultural employment for work in urban areas (even
if their work remains within the informal sector).
It is important to note that urban workers in the informal sector may not have the
same household strategies for insurance as their rural counterparts.  Because workers in
rural areas may pay little or no rent and may incur very small monetary costs, they may be
better able to survive periodic downturns in income, especially if community resources are
available and extended family networks provide occasional inflows, as well.  In urban
areas, monetary costs are likely to be much higher, community resources (especially if
workers from the informal sector live in "informal" arrangements, as well) may be limited,
and rural relatives may be unable to reverse the flow of financial resources when the
primary urban income source dries up.  As a result, while urban workers in the informal
sector may earn more than their rural counterparts, they may be more vulnerable to
episodic economic shocks that reduce their monetary income.
Of course, households are not forced to provide income security all by themselves.
At the community level, many  Neighborhood Associations (Rukun Tetangga, or RT)
collect an informal tax to provide welfare assistance in emergencies. Households
contribute a cup of rice (or its monetary equivalent) every week, and these resources are
used to help families that do not have adequate resources. 15 These community support
mechanisms appear to be diminishing  in importance; higher average income levels may be
reducing the perceived need for community mechanisms, and family connections to the
village may weaken as household members find employment outside the village.
Nonetheless, the notion of community support in cases of severe household emergencies
remains valid in much of rural Indonesia; this support mechanism,  however, is less likely to
be important in new urban and peri-urban communities.
A third form of private income insurance may be provided by employers, even in
the informal sector.  Although no written contracts may exist, the relationship between
workers and their employers are governed by social customs and traditions. The resulting
agreements between employers and workers often include some elements of risk sharing;
employers might agree, for example to pay a fixed wage regardless of seasonal or other
fluctuations in demand.  16  Such a process might explain why rural wages, charted on a
monthly basis, show no signs of seasonal variation.  17
remittances  in household  income  in Indonesia. Rural self-employed  farmers  in 1993  were found  to earn
less  than two-thirds  of their income  on the farm. Earnings  from  wages  (10.5%),  non-farm  activities
(8.5%) and capital (14%)  represented  significant  components  of overall  income; miscellaneous  income,
including  gifts  and remittances,  represented  less  than 5 percent  of total household  income.
15 F. Wiebe,  1992,  p. 5.
16 World  Development  Reort,  The World  Bank, 1995,  p. 87.
"Statistik  Upah Buruh  Tani di Pedesaan  1988-1994,  Biro  Pusat Statistik,  1995.
17Public Income Security Mechanisms
Although the vast majority of workers in low- and middle-income countries rely on
informal private mechanisms such as those described above, governments often intervene
to complement them. While Indonesia has no single program that represents a social safety
net for workers in the informal sector, a collection of government programs combine to
provide some additional income security.
DEPNAKER (Ministry of Manpower):  One of the most common forms of
government security found in other countries are public works programs.  By providing
work at low wages, employment can be targeted at those who really need income support.
Moreover, if the programs are well-designed, they can generate important new
infrastructure, as well.
In Indonesia, the absence of such a scheme is notable, but for many years,
DEPNAKER administered a public works scheme called Padat Karya.  In 1994, however,
the central government ended all of its Padat Karya efforts as part of the new 5- and 25-
Year Plans.  Officials  in the Ministry of Manpower indicated that past Padat Karya efforts,
because of their short duration (most lasted only a few weeks or months), were severely
limited in their developmental impact.  Moreover, the central government felt that such
projects could be better planned and implemented  at the provincial level.  19 Since the
central government has pulled out of this program, very few Padat Karya projects have
been undertaken, as regional governments appear reluctant to continue these efforts
without funding from the center.
Even with the termination of Padat Karya efforts, DEPNAKER has remained
active in attempting to address the problem of underemployment. Given that the primary
criticism of Padat Karya projects was their short duration, it is not surprising that the new
efforts to address the problem were designed to provide training and to promote self-
reliance. With an array of programs, including Tenaga Kerja Mandiri Terdidik (TKMT,
for Well-Educated and Self-Reliant  Workforce) and Tenaga Kerja Pemuda Mandiri
Professional (TKPMP, for Professional and Self-Reliant Young Workforce), the Ministry
of Manpower has chosen education and training as the long-term strategy for improving
conditions for workers in the labor market.
The design of each program is different to accommodate the special needs of each
group, according to their educational background. TKPMP, for example, is targeted at
high school (SMA) graduates and junior college (Sarjana) degree holders.  Participants are
provided brief training sessions (from 2 weeks to three months, depending on the location)
before they are sent to assist as volunteers at either IDT or transmigration villages for 2-3
18  Padat Karya  programs  were also  closely  monitored  to insure  a fair and reasonable  rotation across
kabupatens  and kecamatans. As a result,  a location  that had drought in two  successive  years would  have  a
very  hard time requesting  a Padat Karya  project  in the second  year if it had already received  such
assistance  the previous  year.
9 Personal  interview  with DEPNAKER  official,  November,  1995.
18years. 20 This time in the field is seen as having two purposes.  First, the volunteers may
provide assistance to the village groups in deciding how to use their IDT funds.  Second,
the time is expected to be an educational experience for the graduates, and DEPNAKER
hopes that they will be able to identify new business opportunities during their work in the
village. 2'  This program is currently in its first year of operation, and has 450 participants
involved in 10 provinces. Over the next five years, DEPNAKER hopes to pass 50,000
graduates through its program.
If successful in generating a new generation of entrepreneurs, these training
programs may have employment implications even beyond the list of participants.  Even
so, the immediate effects will be felt by a rather limited group that actually receives the
training.  Thus, while education and training may represent a valid strategy for addressing
the long-term needs of the labor market in the informal sector, it is important to note that
these programs do not provide a significant  amount of income security for the broader
community in the short-run.
BAPPENAS (National Planning Agency): Although DEPNAKER has primary
responsibility for issues relating to the Indonesian labor force, other ministries are also
involved in projects that affect the labor market.  In 1994, BAPPENAS began
implementing  a new anti-poverty program called Inpres Desa Tertinggal (IDT, for
Presidential Decree Program for Least Developed Villages). The program is designed to
channel roughly US$200 million each year to the poorest households in the least
developed villages. 22 By the end of 1997, IDT will have covered more than 28,000 villages
and provided assistance to more than 12 million  poor households. 23
Clearly, IDT was designed with the objective of poverty alleviation, not income
security, and the two are different economic phenomenon. But while programs designed
to improve income security may not alleviate poverty, successful poverty alleviation
programs by definition diminish the danger of income insecurity. 24 Higher income levels,
20 Although  they are referred  to as "volunteers,"  each participant  is provided  a monthly  stipend  of Rp.
250,000  during their assignment.
21 In fact, the selection  of candidates  involves  some assessment  of the candidate's ability  to become  a
private  entrepreneur  after completing  the program,  as indicated  by the candidate's  family's positions  in
the private sector,  and its ability  to provide  seed  capital at a later  date.
22 Villages  were selected  based on their score  on an index of indicators  of social  and infrastructure
development.  Households  are selected  by community  groups  (POKMAS),  and are intended  to include  the
poorest  families. For a more  detailed  description  of the village selection  process,  see Identification  of Poor
Villages  1994:  A Brief  Explanation,  Biro Pusat Statistik,  1995.
23 On January 11, 1996,  the Population  Ministry  announced  the development  of a new  program to provide
assistance  to poor households  located  in non-IDT  villages. Large corporations  known locally  as
conglomerates)  have  been asked  to set aside  funds which will  be channeled  into savings  accounts  held  by
poor households,  and which will be used  as seed  capital for new  rural investments  by the poor.
24 Since income  security  is related  to both income  levels  (positively)  and fluctuations  in incomes
(negatively),  a program  which  raises incomes  among  the poor  also increases  their income  security,
assuming  that income  variability  remains  at least the same  as before. If that program raises incomes  by
introducing  new economic  opportunities  whose  pattern of fluctuations  is unrelated  to the patterns  of
19even in the face of continued income insecurity, allow individuals and households to
spread more effectively the costs due to fluctuations in employment and income.
Moreover, the effect on the labor market is not limited to the economic
implications of IDT interventions. To complement IDT activities, the World Bank and the
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan (OECF) are investing in infrastructure
projects (on- and off-Java, respectively) near IDT villages to improve those villages'
connections to nearby and distant markets. 25 The World Bank projects (VIP, for Village
Infrastructure Projects) may, in some sense, substitute for some Padat Karya efforts, as
they typically seek to maximize labor content, to employ local labor, and to improve local
infrastructure and, like Padat Karya, the projects are rather short in duration with no
expectation of additional projects in the same villages in the near future. 26
In at least one important way, however, the VIP efforts differ from past Padat
Karya projects: the wage paid by VIP for unskilled labor is above the market rate, while
the Padat Karya wage was always below the market rate. 27 While the VIP wage is not far
above the market rate, in the past Padat Karya used low wages as a targeting mechanism,
and this apparently is not part of the VIP design.  In West Java, one kecarnatan official
indicated that they do not even call the daily rate paid for work on the VIP construction a
"wage" (upah), as it would set an unreasonable expectation for payment in other
government projects.
When considering the VIP efforts in the context of income security, there are two
important lessons to be learned. 28 First, if the work pays a daily wage, there is substantial
demand for such work in rural Indonesia. The past experience of Padat Karya suggests
that this is true even if the wage is at or slightly  below the prevailing daily wage.  Second,
projects such as VIP (and Padat Karya), which have no expectation of a prolonged
existence in a region, may provide some income assistance, but they do not fundamentally
alter the conditions of income security provided by local labor markets.
traditional income  sources,  the additional  income  security  gained through  the poverty  alleviation  efforts
will be even  greater.
25 The construction  of new infrastructure  both on- and off-Java  has been  focused  predominantly  on roads
and bridges,  but also has included  some water and sanitation  projects.
26 One IDT site visited in the province  of Sukabumi,  West  Java, lasted  approximately  six months.
27 In Sukabumi,  unskilled  labor  is paid Rp.  2,500  per half day (7 a.m. to 1  or 2 p.m.) which,  according  to
local  officials,  is slightly  above  current wages  in the private  sector. At another  IDT site, local
administrators  reported  that some  family  members  in nearby  urban areas  had returned  to the village to
participate  in the employment  opportunities  generated  by the VIP construction  efforts. This experience
may  be unusual, however,  as VIP  program  officials  have described  villages  where  village  beneficiaries
have  decided  themselves  to pay labor  wages  below  the market  rate (and  apparently sometimes  labor is
even  donated  by villagers  to the project)  to maximize  the amount  of infrastructure  improvement  that can
be made  with a given allocation  of VIP resources.
28 This description  should not be read as a criticism  of the VIP;  these  projects  were never designed  with
income security  as an objective.
20DEPSOS  (Department  of Social  Affairs):  The loss of income  is frequently
associated  with the loss of employment,  but it can also happen  as the result  of an inability
to work because  of a physical  disability,  sickness  or old age.29  Both DEPNAKER  and
BAPPENAS  approach  income  insecurity  as a result  of the loss of employment.  The
Department  of Social  Affairs,  on the other hand,  has programs  in place  to deal  with both
sources  of income  insecurity.  DEPSOS  has a general  4-step program  that is used  to assist
vulnerable  groups;  this approach  aims:  i) to provide  guidance  and counseling;  ii) to
provide  training  often lasting  6-12 months  according  to each  person's capabilities;  iii) to
provide  seed capital  for new economic  activities;  and iv)  to provide  continuing  long-term
guidance. This approach  is applied  through  separate  programs  to a whole  rang of socially-
disadvantaged  groups,  including  street children,  the physically  disabled,  the elderly  and
vulnerable  women.
But while  the common  perception  is that DEPSOS  works only  with socially-
disadvantaged  groups,  the Department  of Social  Affairs  also is active  in helping  poor
families  and households  who lose income  as a result  of natural  disaster. In fact, these
programs  are very similar  in appearance  to some  of the efforts  undertaken  by the other
two ministries  described  above,  both in terms of the target group and the assistance
mechanisms.
The most ambitious  program  may  be the help  for poor families,  Penyantunan  dan
Pengentasan  Fakir  Miskin (PPFM,  for Assistance  for the Poor) that has been designed  as
a complement  to the IDT program. DEPSOS  has identified  approximately  3 million
households  that are poor and have  no permanent  employment;  these families,  moreover,
are characterized  by limited  education  and limited  social  support  mechanisms.  Most of
these households  are on Java and all are in non-IDT  villages. The selection  of households
is made by local leaders  (either  the Lurah or the Kepala  Desa).
PPFM uses  the 4-step process  described  above  to provide  both training  and
financial  resources  to help  these farnilies  improve  their standard  of living. To date, many
of the participants  have  become  involved  in economic  activities  such as animal  husbandry
and traditional  handicrafts. Although  PPFM has identified  approximately  3 million
households,  coverage  remains  limited,  in the current  5-year  plan,  DEPSOS  plans  to
provide  assistance  to 200,000  households. 30
In addition  to these on-going  programs,  DEPSOS  is also active in providing
assistance  to victims  of natural  disasters  (including  floods,  droughts,  and earthquakes)
through the program Bantuan dan Rehabilitasi Korban Bencana (BRKB, Natural
Disaster  Relief  and Rehabilitation).  In the case  of drought,  food assistance  in the form of
free rice is provided  to affected  households. 3'  In response  to other emergencies,  much  of
29 World  Development  Regort,  The World  Bank, 1995,  p. 87.
30 Increasing  the Welfare  of Poor  Families,  Department  of Social  Affairs, 1994,  p.39.
3' In the past, there was some  competition  between  this program  and Padat Karya  efforts. Although
drought  victims appreciated  Padat Karya  projects,  they preferred  getting  on the DEPSOS  list, as this
assistance  is provided  without  any work  requirement.
21the assistance provided through this program goes towards rehabilitating damaged
housing.  Although this program is more limited in scope, providing assistance to
approximately 2,000 households each year since 1990, it may represent an important
source of insurance in the event of unexpected disasters.  If there is significant  insecurity
caused by the threat of droughts or floods, there may be some scope for expanding this or
similar efforts rather than creating entirely new mechanisms.
III. The Rationale for a New Income Security Scheme in Indonesia
Although some observers see the problem of income insecurity as a relatively
recent phenomenon produced by the transition from a primarily  rural and traditional
society to an industrial and modem one, the description of underemployment in Indonesia
presented in the first section of this paper suggests that this problem is not so much a
product of the transition process as it is of not participating in that process.  As people
move out of rural areas and into jobs in the modem sector, underemployment and the
income uncertainty it causes decline. And while it is impossible  to determine any pattern
over time from looking at one year of data, the structural nature of underemployment
suggests that it should become less of  problem over time.
Similarly,  recent economic developments suggest that income insecurity should
become less of a problem in the future.  Rising average income levels, combined with an
increasing multiplicity of employment opportunities (even those that are part-time and
located in the informal sector), suggest that more households are becoming less vulnerable
to fluctuations in the labor market all the time.
This optimistic story, however, still is consistent with the picture presented by the
SAKERNAS  data and with the field observation that many Indonesians remain eager to
accept wage employment at virtually any time of the year. Underemployment remains a
common problem, especially in the informal sector, and average incomes remain low
throughout rural Indonesia.  These two circumstances, however, do not necessarily
translate into income insecurity unless no mechanisms, whether generated by the
household, the local community or the central government, are in place to spread out the
risks of income loss. In Indonesia, household mechanisms appear to be functioning
relatively well, and a patchwork of other community and government programs represent
significant additional sources of insurance; as a result, the problem of income insecurity as
a result of underemployment does not appear to be pervasive throughout the informal
sector.
While this conclusion suggests that no new nationwide scheme for alleviating
income insecurity is necessary at this time, it does not categorically reject that possibility
that the Government of Indonesia could do something new to improve the living standards
of workers in the informal sector.  There are two possible grounds for new or expanded
action to address the problem of underemployment in the informal sector.  First, there
almost certainly are locations where vulnerability to economic shocks at the household
22level  is a significant  problem,  and a targeted  new public  works  program  could be used to
provide  income  security  to vulnerable  workers  in the informal  sector. Second,
underemployment,  by itself,  could  be identified  by the Government  of Indonesia  as an
economic  and social  problem  requiring  policy  recourse,  even  if it is unrelated  to the
concept  of income  insecurity  at the household  level. These  two rationales,  however,
justify  two very differently  structured  programs;  each is considered  below.
Public Works to Provide Income Security
As mentioned  above,  there almost  certainly  are locations  where  vulnerability  to
economic  shocks  at the household  level is a significant  problem. This vulnerability  usually
is the result  of very low income  levels  combined  with very limited  outside  income
opportunities. These conditions  can be found in some  part of Java,  but are more
commonly  observed  in some  of the outlying  provinces. 32
A program  designed  to provide  income  security  to the vulnerable  workers  in the
informal  sector  would  need to incorporate  three important  features:  geographical
targeting,  household  targeting,  and an adequate  duration  period. Because  income
insecurity  is not a pervasive  problem  in all parts of Indonesia,  a new  program  would  need
to be directed  at the areas  with the highest  vulnerability  as opposed  to all areas
characterized  by low incomes. On Java,  for example,  the vulnerability  suggested  by low
levels  of individual  earnings  may  be mitigated  to some  extent  by the fact that households
in many  parts of Java face a rich set of possible  income  sources  to provide  household
income  security;  in such areas,  no new scheme  to provide  additional  income  security  may
be necessary. 33 Even on Java,  however,  it is likely  that households  located  in remote and
isolated  areas (e.g., coastal  or mountainous  villages)  and characterized  by low income
levels  may still  face the problem  of income  insecurity.
Similarly,  many  low income  areas in Eastern  Indonesia  appear  to lack the informal
insurance  provided  by growing  demand  for labor. In such  areas, low incomes  and the
paucity  of income  security  mechanisms  may  translate  into serious  vulnerability  to
economic  shocks. Under  such conditions,  significant  segments  of the population  may  have
investment  and consumption  decisions  distorted  by income  insecurity. Any  program
designed  to address  the problem  of income  security  would  need  to concentrate  its efforts
on specific  and isolated  vulnerable  regions  on Java (and on Sumatra,  Kalimantan  and
Sulawesi)  and more  broadly  on the vulnerable  provinces  in Eastern  Indonesia. 34 This
geographical  variation  in vulnerability  suggests  that a program  designed  to provide
32 See, for example, Timmer, et al (1993),
33In fact, in such areas, new wage-paying public works schemes may undermine or even displace some of
the welfare-enhancing activities already taking place in the private sector.
34 At the program design stage, program planners must note that income vulnerability probably is not
measured very well by underemployment statistics.  The fact that Bali records more than twice the rate of
underemployment than does NTT should make anyone wary of using this statistic as an indicator of the
need for additional income security programs.  A program to provide additional income security might be
better targeted using information about income levels and local infrastructure than using employment
data.
23additional income security would need to be targeted at low administrative  levels (at least
at the kabupaten level, and possibly at the kecamatan or village level).
The second important feature of a public works program designed to provide
income security is the method of identifying  participants in the program.  The description
of the problem of underemployment presented in the first section of this paper
demonstrates that the problem is difficult to categorize beyond its overwhelmingly  rural
nature and its concentration among prime-age adults (15-44 years old) with low education
levels (SD or below).  While this description may not appear very fine, it is helpful for the
purposes here, as it suggests that the most vulnerable groups probably would be reachable
through a public works program that is mainly based in rural areas. 35
Understanding at this level who the vulnerable are, however, does not help very
much in excluding non-participants, an essential part of a security program if it is to be
affordable. Experience with public works programs in other countries, as well as that in
Indonesia in the past, suggests that the most effective mechanism  for targeting is the use
of a low wage. 36 When wages are set at or above the prevailing wage rate, a very high
proportion of the population will be interested in participating, and this will force the
government either to expand the size of the program to accommodate everyone or, more
likely, to ration the jobs among those who are interested, thereby severely diminishing  the
beneficial impact on income security among the vulnerable. 37 According to one study of
Maharashtra's Employment Guarantee Scheme, the program effectively provided
protection to the vulnerable as long as wages were maintained below both the minimum
wage and the prevailing market wages; when, in 1988, the program wage was adjusted
upwards, demand for work increased as well, forcing the program to ration jobs and
diminish the protection provided to the most vulnerable groups of workers. 38 Some VIP
efforts provide evidence of a similar experience of job rationing in Indonesia. Paying a
low wage may seem to run counter to the program's objective of providing security to
low-income workers, but it may be the best way of insuring that those low-income
workers actually have the opportunity to participate.
The third important feature of an income security program is that it provide
assistance in the most vulnerable locations for an adequate period of time.  Past  Padat
Karya programs generated important new infrastructure, but the very short duration of
projects and the enforced rotation among districts ensured that they did not have a very
significant impact on vulnerability and income security. A new program designed to
35 Public works  programs  need not be located  only  in rural areas; many  of the standard projects
implemented  in rural areas are suitable  for many urban and peri-urban  areas, as well.
36 Subbarao  (1995),  for example,  argues  that maintaining  a low  wage rate is the best way of ensuring that
the people  who need  the jobs are the ones who get them.
37 Recalling  the discussion  of the definition  of underemployment  presented  earlier in this paper, workers
evaluate  their employment  status  given the prevailing  wage  rate. Any  project  that pays a higher wage in
effect  forces  people  to re-evaluate  their employment  status;  at a higher wage,  many more  people will want
to work  additional  hours (and hence  will consider  themselves  underemployed).
38 See Datt and Ravallion,  1994, for a description  of this program  and the importance  of wage-based
targeting  in public  works  programs.
24address these problems would need to incorporate this understanding into its design by
providing long-term assistance in areas with chronic problems of income insecurity.  Such
a program need not be very large in size, but it would require a commitment to providing
some new employment opportunities in a region on a long-term basis. 39 The use of low
wages would provide an adequate incentive for individuals  to exit the program as soon as
possible, but the knowledge that employment in the program was available would provide
a form of insurance against unanticipated economic shocks. Extended duration reinforces
the importance of the other two features; to provide income security, a public works
program will need to be seen as a long-term commitment to the local labor market.
Although each of the three features is important to the goal of enhancing income
security, the first two may be difficult to implement in the Indonesian context.  The
targeting of program resources only to a few isolated regions runs counter to the standard
government approach of spreading development resources as equally as possible across all
regions; recent poverty programs have allowed disproportionate shares of resources to
flow to areas that are recognized as backwards, but still virtually all regions have been
included in the programs.  Similarly,  the payment of wages below the prevailing rate
contravenes the government's recent drive to boost the minimum  wage; the government
may find it difficult  to pay a wage below that legally required of private firms. Without
adequate geographic and household targeting, however, such a scheme could quickly
become either unaffordable or significantly  diluted in its impact on income insecurity.
What is known about the state of the labor market in the informal sector suggests that a
new public works program could be used to address the problem of income insecurity in
Indonesia, but to do so, such a program would need to be designed very differently  than
were the Padat Karya programs of the past.
Public Works to Address Underemployment
The second rationale for designing new mechanisms to address underemployment
is based on the understanding that underemployment, by itself, represents an economic and
social problem requiring policy recourse, even if it is unrelated to the concept of income
insecurity at the household level. The current situation in the labor market reflects the fact
that a significant portion of the workforce attains only very low levels of productivity, and
this underutilized resource represents not only a waste of human capital, but also a
tremendous opportunity for the government to stimulate higher levels of productivity from
the workforce.
The main criterion for this kind of public works program is that projects would be
identified that produce positive economic returns, even as they utilize underemployed
labor.  The positive experience in many VIP villages indicate that such investments can be
identified throughout Indonesia and that these projects can provide some new employment
opportunities.  A large proportion of workers in the informal sector want wage
39 Given  the Government  of Indonesia's  apparent  interest in an equal sharing  of government  resources
across  villages  and regions,  implementing  a program  that provides  support  to a limited  number  of areas
for an extended  period of time may  be problematic.
25opportunities, even if their households have already attained a level of income security,
and rural infrastructure projects may be the mechanism  for providing those opportunities.
Such a program need not have any of the three features described as critical for a
program designed to reduce vulnerability. Geographic targeting becomes far less
important, as significant  underemployment can be found throughout Indonesia.
Household targeting through below-market wages would not be as important, either, as
long as each investment project generates positive returns (if market wages or higher are
used, almost certainly some other form of rationing project employment will need to be
used).  Similarly,  the extended duration of a project in any given locale would not be as
important, as the objective of the program would be directed more at the overall labor
market, rather than chronic underemployment in any specific location. Of course, an
insurance aspect could be introduced to this kind of a program by including one or more
of these features in the program's design.
Conclusion
As the two sub-sections above indicate, thinking about the problems of
underemployment and income insecurity can generate very different types of policy
responses for the Ministry of Manpower.  Although there appears to be little interest in (or
need for) reviving the Padat Karya programs of the past, the Ministry does have an
opportunity to renew its involvement in public works efforts.  Depending on the definition
of program objectives, that new involvement could look very different.
Before any new program is undertaken, however, two issues need to be addressed
directly. First, how serious is the problem of income insecurity in Indonesia? The results
of this research indicate that underemployment, affecting about 12 percent of the
workforce in the informal sector, is not as significant  a problem as popularly believed;
however, only a fraction of those underemployed may actually suffer from income
insecurity.  Thus, the research concludes that there is no compelling evidence of
widespread income insecurity in Indonesia which would warrant a major new government
initiative.
The evidence presented here suggests that any new initiative directed at income
insecurity probably should be limited in scope and focus a disproportionate share of
resources in Eastern Indonesia and in remote or isolated areas on Java that are
characterized by low average income levels. While it may not need to be very large in
terms of funds, such a program would require a long-term commitment of resources.  This
conclusion, however, is reached using indirect evidence of income insecurity from the
informal labor market.  If concerns regarding income insecurity persist, resources would
be well-spent collecting direct information regarding income fluctuations before
implementing a new income security scheme nationwide.
Second, is the main concern income insecurity or underemployment? Better
statistics are available on employment levels, and the 12 percent figure, while considerably
26lower  than the popularly  accepted  40 percent  figure,  may  nonetheless  represent  a policy
concern. A public  works program  designed  to reduce  underemployment  would  probably
be entail  the development  of a program  that would  be more similar  to the past Padat
Karya efforts  or the current  VIP efforts,  and most resources  in such  a program  would
probably  be channeled  to rural  Java. The scope  of such  an effort  could  be rather large (as
underemployment  is found  throughout  the archipelago),  and  the number  of interested
participants  would  certainly  grow were wage  rates set at prevailing  market  levels. The
cost of such a program  could  be very high  (underemployment  is almost  certainly  far more
widespread  than income  insecurity)  and the local effects  on employment  rates would
probably  be thinly  spread  throughout  the population. Indeed,  it was these  two concerns
which  may  have ultimately  lead  to the cessation  of Padat Karya  efforts  in the past;  this
research  does not provide  compelling  evidence  of a need  to revive  the Padat Karya-style
approach  at this time.
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